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COMMENT
Defending the "Decency Clause" in
Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts
INTRODUCTION
The federal government has been financially aiding American
artists, organizations, and institutions through grants awarded by
the National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") since 1965.1 In
November 1990, Congress reauthorized the NEA to continue fund-
ing the arts for three more years, but only after agreeing to adopt
an amendment to the NEA's grant-making procedures.' The
amendment required the NEA to take into consideration "general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values
of the American public" when determining artistic merit and excel-
lence.3 This provision has become known as the "decency clause."
Soon thereafter, the constitutionality of the decency clause was
contested in Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts.4 In Finley,
1. National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
209, § 4, 79 Stat. 845, 846 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-968 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992)).
2. Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, §
318, 104 Stat. 1960, 1963 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. IV 1992));
see 136 CoNG. REc. 817,679 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (the Senate voted in favor of the
amendment); 136 CONG. REC. H12,415-17 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (the House voted in
favor of the amendment).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
4. 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992). On March 29, 1993, the Department of
Justice filed an appellate brief supporting the NEA's constitutional power to impose a
decency standard on the context of funded projects. See Amei Wallach, Arts Partisans
Angry at Clinton Administration, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1993, at F4. The appeal is cur-
rently pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Department of Justice has also settled several causes of action. The government
has agreed to pay the four individual plaintiffs (Karen Finley, Holly Hughes, John Fleck,
and Tim Miller) a total of $50,000 in damages and $202,000 in attorneys' fees. The
artists will receive $6,000 each in compensatory damages based on the NEA's violation
of their rights under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), when
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Judge A. Wallace Tashima of the United States District Court for
the Central District of California held that the decency clause vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment' by failing
to notify applicants adequately of the requirements for receiving
NEA grants and falling to define or limit NEA discretion.6 The
court further held that the decency clause violated the First Amend-
ment7 by encroaching upon protected expression.8
This Comment will examine the reasoning behind the Finley
court's decision that the decency requirement for government fund-
ing of the arts clearly violates the First and Fifth Amendments.
Part I will discuss briefly the background of the NEA and the
adoption of the decency clause. Part II will analyze the court's
holding in Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts. Part III will
criticize the Finley decision and rationale by arguing that the NEA,
in deciding grant applications under the decency clause, is not
restricting protected first amendment speech, but is only allocating
subsidies to support one type of art over another. Part I will
examine congressional spending power under the U.S. Constitu-
tion,9 emphasizing that Congress need not be neutral when deciding
which projects to fund. Part EEI will also argue that the Finely
court's application of a criminal vagueness standard is too strict for
the context of government funding. This Comment will conclude
that the Finley court should have considered Congress' constitu-
tional discretion on matters of federal spending and should have
the NEA revealed details of their grant applications to the press in 1990. Each artist will
also receive a payment equaling his or her 1990 grant recommendation. National En-
dowment for the Arts Settles Lawsuit Brought by Performance Artists, 15 ENT. L. REP. 3,
Aug. 1993, at 28. The parties did not settle the cause of action challenging the consti-
tutionality of the decency clause. See id. This Comment will address the constitutional
issue.
5. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part that "[n]o person shall be ... de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1472.
7. The First Amendment states in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1476.
9. The Constitution empowers Congress to "lay and collect [t]axes, [d]uties, [i]mposts
and fe]xcises, to pay the [d]ebts and provide for the common [djefen(s]e and general
[w]elfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 1.
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acknowledged that an explicit formulation of a decency standard is
impractical and unnecessary in the context of public funding of the
arts.
I. THE NEA AND THE DECENCY CLAUSE
A. Funding Art Through the NEA
In 1965, President Johnson signed into law the National Foun-
dation on the Arts and the Humanities Act ("Act"). 10 The Act
established the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities
("Foundation"), presently composed of the NEA, the National En-
dowment for the Humanities, the Federal Council on the Arts and
the Humanities, and the Institute of Museum Services."1 The pur-
pose of the Foundation is to "develop and promote a broadly con-
ceived national policy of support for the humanities and the arts in
the United States... [and to support] ... institutions which pre-
serve the cultural heritage of the United States."1 2 By providing
10. National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-209, § 4, 79 Stat. 845 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-968 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992)); see also Milton C. Cummings, Jr., Government and the Arts: An Overview,
in PuBUc MoNEY AND THE MuSE 31, 50-52 (Stephen Benedict ed., 1991).
11. National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-209, § 4, 79 Stat. 845, 846 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 953(a) (1988)).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 953(b) (1988). The purpose of the funding program is to provide
or support:
(1) projects and productions which have substantial national or international
artistic and cultural significance, giving emphasis to American creativity and
cultural diversity and to the maintenance and encouragement of professional
excellence;
(2) projects and productions, meeting professional standards or standards of
authenticity or tradition, irrespective of origin, which are of significant merit
and which, without such assistance, would otherwise be unavailable to our
citizens for geographic or economic reasons;
(3) projects and productions that will encourage and assist artists and enable
them to achieve wider distribution of their works, to work in residence at an
educational or cultural institution, or to achieve standards of professional excel-
lence;
(4) projects and productions which have substantial artistic and cultural signifi-
cance and that reach, or reflect the culture of, a minority, inner city, rural, or
tribal community;
(5) projects and productions that will encourage public knowledge, education,
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financial assistance to artists and arts organizations, the NEA pro-
motes works and projects so that the public may better appreciate
the diverse culture and heritage of the United States. 3
The NEA receives approximately 17,000 to 18,000 applications
annually, of which 4000 to 4500 are granted funding. 14 The NEA's
1993 budget is $176 million,' 5 and the combined budget over its
entire history totals approximately $3 billion.16 Organizations and
state'arts agencies receive most of the funds, while individuals
receive a small percentage of the grants.' 7 Fellowships for design,
theater, and visual artists, and grants for arts education and sym-
phonies are also awarded.'8 Only about twenty of its nearly
100,000 grants have incited national controversy, including funding
for the controversial exhibitions by photographers Andres Serrano
and the late Robert Mapplethorpe. 9
understanding, and appreciation of the arts;
(6) workshops that will encourage and develop the appreciation and enjoyment
of the arts by our citizens;
(7) programs for the arts at the local level;
(8) projects that enhance managerial and organizational skills and capabilities;
(9) projects, productions, and workshops of the kinds described in paragraphs
(1) through (8) through film, radio, video, and similar media, for the purpose
of broadening public access to the arts; and
(10) other relevant projects, including surveys, research, planning, and publi-
cations relating to the purposes of this subsection.
20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
13. See 20 U.S.C. § 951(4) (Supp. IV 1992) ("Democracy demands wisdom and
vision in its citizens. It must therefore foster and support a form of education, and access
to the arts and the humanities, designed to make people of all backgrounds and wherever
located masters of their technology and not its unthinking servants.").
14. Amy Sabrin, Thinking About Content: Can It Play an Appropriate Role in
Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L.J. 1209, 1211 n.6 (1993).
15. Jacqueline Trescott, The Arts Agency's Spending Flurry; Last-Minute Grants
Deplete Reserve Fund, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1993, at Cl.
16. John Koch, Spitball Politics Distorts the NEA, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1992, at
73.
17. Rick Zednick, 87-Year Old Basket-Weaver Wins Arts Fellowship, STATES NEWS
SERV., July 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
18. Kathleen O'Steen, East West Players, ICCC, BFA Biggest Winners in NEA
Grants, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 6, 1992, at 62.
19. Koch, supra note 16, at 73. Serrano's photographic work "Piss Christ" is a
collage depiction of a crucifix submerged in urine. Mapplethorpe's exhibition consisted
of several photographs of homoerotic and sadomasochistic images. See William H.
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Applications for government funding generally are submitted
one fiscal year before the applicants require the funds. 20 The appli-
cants must first describe both the subject matter and the prospective
audience of the proposed art, estimate the cost of the project, speci-
fy the total amount requested from the NEA, and provide informa-
tion about all sources of funding.2 NEA staff members review the
applications to determine if all the requirements have been Tlet.
Then, a Peer Advisory Panel examines the applications and gives
its recommendations to the National Council on the Arts ("Coun-
cil").2 " The Council gives suggestions to the Chairperson who
ultimately is responsible for granting funding approval.23
B. The Adoption of the Decency Clause
After the displays of controversial projects including works by
photographers Mapplethorpe and Serrano, many Americans ex-
pressed outrage to their government representatives that taxpayer
money had contributed to their exhibitions.24 In response, Congress
adopted a provision that contained explicit content restrictions in
the 1990 NEA fiscal funding bill.' The amendment provided, inter
alia, that an NEA grant recipient may not "promote, disseminate,
or produce [art that the NEA may consider] obscene, including but
Honan, Endowment Embattled Over Academic Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1989, at
42.
20. Stephen N. Sher, Note, The Identical Treatment of Obscene and Indecent Speech:
The 1991 NEA Appropriations Act, 67 CI.-KENT L. REv. 1107, 1115 (1991).
21. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(0-() (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
22. See 1979 NEA ANN. REP. 4 (1980).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The Act provides for a Chairperson
who will award the grants with the advice of the National Council on the Arts. Id.
24. See 136 CONG. REc. S7591 (daily ed. June 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simpson)
("I am receiving calls from some constituents wanting to know just why we have set up
this Endowment to do nothing but support obscenity and profanity."); but see 136 CONG.
REc. H3805 (daily ed. June 19, 1990) (statement of Rep. Rangel) ("[H]undreds and
hundreds of my constituents have written me asking me to support the NEA and oppose
new censorship policies for the NEA.").
25. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989); see also Michael Wingfield
Walker, Artistic Freedom v. Censorship: The Aftermath of the NEA's New Funding
Restrictions, 17 WASH. U. L.Q. 937, 950 (1993); Pamela Weinstock, Note, The National
Endowment for the Arts Funding Controversy and the Miller Test: A Plea for the Reunifi-
cation of Art and Society, 72. B.U. L. REV. 803, 809, 811 (1992).
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not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the
sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts
and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value."26
In 1990, responding to judicial challenges to the so-called "ob-
scenity provision, '  Congress again debated the reauthorization of
the NEA with intense and heated arguments. 28 The outcome of all
of the debates and voting was the adoption of the decency provi-
sion on November 5, 1990.29 The provision states that "artistic
excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications
are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public. 30
The language of the decency clause reflects a compromise
made among members of Congress." Members of Congress voiced
26. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989). See Walker, supra note 25,
at 50 (discussing the adoption of the restriction); see Weinstock, supra note 25, at 809-
811 (discussing the adoption of the restriction).
27. See, e.g., Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774
(C.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that a requirement that NEA grant recipients certify that funds
awarded would not be used to promote works prohibited under the obscenity provision
was unconstitutional). See infra note 203 for a discussion of the case.
28. See 136 CONG. REC. S7591 (daily ed. June 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simpson)
(described as "an overample supply of hysteria and histrionics and high melodrama"); 136
CONG. REC. S18,008-10 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("For a year
and a half-since May 1989--this Congress has spent thousands and thousands of hours
of staff and Member time-and more public funds then I want to calculate--on going
round and round, in committees and on the floors, on the issue of the NEA, and whether
to kill, cut, or alter it."); see also Thomas Walsh, NEA Awaits '92 Budget Raise as "Ob-
scenity" Debate Continues; National Endowmentfor the Arts, BACK STAGE PUB., INC., Oct.
25, 1991, at 1.
29. Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, §
318, 104 Stat. 1960, 1963 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. IV 1992));
see Julie Ann Alagna, Note, 1991 Legislation, Reports and Debates Over Federally
Funded Art: Arts Community Left With an "Indecent" Compromise, 48 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1545, 1548-51 (1991) (discussing the adoption of the decency clause).
30. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
31. See Catherine Foster, Endowment for Arts Wins a Court Round in Obscenity
Debate, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNrFOR, June 12, 1992, at 3. Contra Alagna, supra note 29, at
1551 ("mhe NEA now will screen potential grant recipients and weed out possible inde-
cency in the art that the agency decides to fund[;] [s]uch censoring permitted by the
[Vol. 4:627
DEFENDING THE DECENCY CLAUSE
distinct opinions ranging from closing down the NEA32 to
reauthorizing the NEA without content restrictions.33 On the one
hand, United States Representative Philip M. Crane (R-Ill.) pro-
posed an amendment that would abolish the NEA altogether.' The
conflict between an artist's right to freedom of expression and a
taxpayer's right to determine how his or her money should be spent
prompted the "easy" solution to abolish the NEA.5 On the other
hand, some Congress members voted in favor of reauthorizing the
NEA with no content restriction because of the important work the
NEA accomplishes 36 and because they believed that content restric-
tions would violate the First Amendment.
37
Representative Dana T. Robrabacher (R-Cal.) proposed lan-
guage that prohibited specific activities or projects.38 Prohibited
subjects included the desecration of the flag and child pornography
or projects that are "obscene; ... that denigrate the beliefs, tenets
or objects of a particular religion; or that denigrate a person or
group on the basis of race, sex, handicap or national origin. 39
[decency clause] is not a compromise at all.") (citations omitted).
32. See 136 CONG. REC. H9407 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990).
33. See 136 CONG. REc. H3804-07 (daily ed. June 19, 1990).
34. See 136 CONG. REC. H9407 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990).
35. Id. at H9427 (statement of Rep. Armey) ("the easiest way is to abolish the
agency and rid ourselves of the heart of the problem").
36. See 136 CONG. REC. S9563 (daily ed. July 11, 1990); 136 CONG. REC. H3804
(daily ed. June 19, 1990). Rep. Edolphus Towns (D-N.Y.) stated that
[t]here are some who contend that public funding should not be used to fund
the arts. However, I think that a lesson in history may be instructive. In the
Great Depression, the WPA was a part of President Roosevelt's new deal. In
this country's most difficult political and economic times, there was a national
policy which appreciated the magnificent potential in the contribution of artists
to shore up the national spirit and move the country toward prosperity.
Id.
37. See 136 CONG. REC. H3805 (daily ed. June 19, 1990) (statement of Rep. Weiss)
("[R]estrictions based on political content of art challenge the integrity of the U.S. Consti-
tution. Many constitutional scholars believe that such restrictions violate the first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of expression.").
38. See 136 CONG. REC. H9427 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990).
39. Id. H9406-07; see also Alagna, supra note 29, at 1568 n.1 17 (citing Richard L.
Berke, House Approves Compromise Bill to Continue Arts Endowment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1990, at C3; Jill Zuckman, Obscenity Debate-House Approves Compromise on Arts
Endowment Bill, CONG. Q., Oct. 13, 1990, at 3423).
1993]
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Representative Rohrabacher was reacting to his constituents' desire
not to fund projects that are "morally reprehensible." 4
Representatives Patrick Williams (D-Mont.) and E. Thomas
Coleman (R-Mo.) developed a bipartisan proposal ('Williams-
Coleman compromise") which included the decency clause.4 1 Their
goal was to make the government more accountable to the taxpayer
"without intruding on the constitutional creativity and rights of all
Americans., 42  The Williams-Coleman compromise stressed the
need for the NEA to distribute funding in a way that will be sup-
ported by the public and to increase public confidence in using
taxpayer money4 The Williams-Coleman compromise was
amended to the 1991 NEA fiscal funding statuteM which was final-
ly adopted by both Houses of Congress on October 27, 1990.41
II. FINLEY V. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS
A. Background of the Suit
The controversy over the decency clause arose when four per-
formance artists, Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim
Miller46 ("individual plaintiffs"), each applied for NEA funding
40. 136 CoNG. REC. H9408 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher)
("[Our constituents] will be watching, and they will know that there is only one way to
make the NEA responsible, and that is to vote 'yes' on the Rohrabacher amendment..
• .11).
41. Id. at H9410. The Williams-Coleman compromise included a provision that
prohibits the NEA from funding obscenity. See id.
42. Id. (statement of Rep. Coleman).
43. Id. (statement of Rep. Coleman) ("Works which deeply offend the sensibilities
of significant portions of the public ought not to be supported with public funds. That
is a statement of common sense, of prudence, of sensibility to the beliefs and values of
those who, after all, pay the taxes to support [the NEA].").
44. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 318, 104 Stat. 1915, 1963 (1990). It also contained provisions
for the protection of natural resources on public lands, the protection of native American
interest, and the development of new energy sources. See generally Pub. L. No. 101-512,
140 Stat. 1915 (1990).
45. 136 CONG. REC. S17,679 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); 136 CoNG. REC. H12,415-17
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
46. Performance artist Karen Finley is known for a stage presentation which includes
stripping and smearing her body with chocolate and alfalfa sprouts, symbolizing women
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under the Performance Artists Program.47 After the Performance
Artists Program Peer Review Panel ("Panel") reviewed their appli-
cations along with ninety other applications, the Panel recom-
mended that eighteen applications be funded, including the four
plaintiffs' applications. 41 On June 28, 1990, however, the NEA in-
formed the individual plaintiffs that funding was denied for their
projects, and the individual plaintiffs brought this suit, alleging the
violation of their constitutional and statutory rights.49
The National Association of Artists' Organizations ("NAAO")0
forced to wallow in excrement and sperm. Elka Worner, Federal Judge Rules NEA
Decency Clause Unconstitutional, PROPRIErARY TO THE UNITED PRESS INT'L, June 9,1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File. The other three artists include graphic
sexual material and homosexual themes in their work. Id. John Fleck, in his performance
for A Snowball's Chance in Hell, reads from "a roll of toilet paper as though it were some
sacred scroll [and] spills out a stream of psychotically linked snippets from the press,
television and other sources." Steven Winn, Solo Mio Festival Starts Out with "Hell",
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 10, 1992, at E3.
47. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1462 (C.D. Cal.
1992).
48. id.
49. Id. Before the Council met to review the eighteen recommended NEA fellow-
ships and grants, a syndicated newspaper column quoted from Finley's funding applica-
tion, which the NEA had released to the press. Id. The Council met in May but deferred
consideration of the Performance Artists Program fellowships until its August meeting.
In June 1990, however, then-NEA Chairman John E. Frohnmayer polled members of the
Council by individual telephone calls concerning the Performance Artists Program grants.
Id. After receiving their denial, individual plaintiffs filed this suit. Id. They asserted that
the NEA and Frohnmayer violated their constitutional and statutory rights by improperly
denying their applications for NEA funds and by releasing to the public information from
their application forms. Id. at 1460. The claims of statutory violations are beyond the
scope of this Comment and will not be addressed. See supra note 4 and accompanying
text for settlement information. This Comment will focus on plaintiffs' facial constitu-
tional challenge of the decency clause.
Frohnmayer resigned from the NEA after this action was commenced; Anne-Imelde
Radice succeeded him. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1460 n.l. On January 1993, Radice left
her position and named Ana M. Steele as Senior Deputy Chairperson. On August 1993,
President Clinton nominated Jane Alexander as the NEA Chairperson. Joyce Price,
Alexander's Hearing Could Serve Double Purpose; NEA's Future, Plus Nominee's Quali-
fications Likely Targets, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at A7. On October 8, 1993,
Alexander was sworn in as Chairperson in the Library of Congress. Mark Bousian,
Alexander Sworn in as Chair of the NEA, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1993, at F4.
50. The NAAO, founded in 1982, is a nonprofit organization "dedicated to serving,
promoting, and protecting artist-driven" groups. Valerie Boyd, Arts Atlanta Area Arts
1993]
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joined the individual plaintiffs in their claims against the NEA after
Congress adopted the decency clause in November 1990.51 The
NAAO feared that the new standard would chill the scope of the
artistic work of many of its members.52 The plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the decency provision, on its face, was void for
vagueness in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and that it deprived plaintiffs of their guarantee of
free speech in violation of the First Amendment.53
B. The Finley Decision
1. Standing
Because the individual plaintiffs' applications were denied be-
fore the decency clause had been adopted, the court first had to
determine the individual artists' standing in their suit.54 Defendants
argued that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the facial
validity of the decency clause55 because the individual plaintiffs'
applications were denied approximately four months before the
provision was adopted.56 They argued that the allegations of a
"chilling effect" could not support standing and that plaintiffs could
not show any threatened or actual injury from the challenged provi-
Confab Timed for Festival, ATLANTA J. & CONT., Sept. 12, 1993, at N2.
51. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1463.
52. Id. at 1470.
53. Id. at 1460. In addition, individual plaintiffs alleged that the NEA and Chair
Frohnmayer violated their constitutional and statutory rights by improperly denying their
applications for NEA grants and by releasing certain information from their application
files to the public. Id. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief on their constitu-
tional and statutory funding claims and also damages on the Privacy Act claim. See
supra note 4 for settlement information.
54. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1469-70. To establish standing, "a plaintiff must show
that (1) 'he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury' as a result of defen-
dants' actions; (2) the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action;' and (3) the
injury is 'likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."' Id. at 1468 (quoting Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
55. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings: "(1) the NEA's funding
decisions are unreviewable because they are committed to agency discretion by law; (2)
venue is improper as to the Privacy Act claim; and (3) plaintiffs lack standing to chal-
lenge the facial validity of the 'decency clause' because they cannot establish the neces-
sary injury." Id. at 1460. Only the third pleading will be addressed in this Comment.
56. Id. at 1461, 1468.
[Vol. 4:627
DEFENDING THE DECENCY CLAUSE
sion"
The court found that plaintiffs Hughes and Miller, both of
whom had received funding under the new statute, had standing
because they risked forfeiting their grants if they engaged in be-
havior determined by the NEA to be against the decency clause.5"
In addition, the court stated that these plaintiffs faced threatened
and actual harm because they must restrict their expressive conduct
in order to ensure retention of their grants in the present and in the
future.59 The standing of plaintiffs Finley and Fleck was less clear
because they alleged only that they had "foregone their application
opportunity out of 'fear' that they would be denied funding."60 The
court, however, reasoned that it was unnecessary to determine the
standing of Finley and Fleck since the other two plaintiffs had met
the "injury" prong of the standing test.6' In addition, the court
found that the NAAO had standing because the organization al-
leged that some of its members who had received NEA grants
under the new standards were "chilled" in their works' scopes and
were uncertain as to how to comply with the provision.6 2 The
court recognized that the NAAO sought to protect the "freedom of
artistic expression, an interest germane to [its] organizational pur-
pose." 63
2. Protection Against Vagueness Under the Fifth Amend-
ment
Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Connally v. General
Construction Co.,64 the Finley court found that the decency clause
57. id. at 1468.
58. Id. at 1469.
59. Id.
60. id.
61. Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264 n.9 (1977) (other plaintiffs need not be considered for standing to maintain the suit
since at least one individual plaintiff had demonstrated standing)).
62. Id. at 1470.
63. Id.
64. 269 U.S. 385 (1926). The statute in Connally, OKLA. COMP. STAT. § 7255 (1921),
created an eight-hour day for persons employed by or on behalf of the state and provided
that the employees shall not be paid less than the current rate of day wages in the locality
where the work was performed. Id. at 388. A corresponding statute imposed a fine
1993]
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failed to notify applicants adequately of what is required of them6s
because "persons 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at [the] meaning and differ as to [the] application' of the decency
clause.66 In Connally, the Supreme Court maintained that a penal
statute must be explicit when informing the public of the specific
conduct that is forbidden.67 The Finley court, therefore, found the
decency clause to be vague and held that the adopted provision was
void under the Fifth Amendment's due process requirement.
68
The court was persuaded by plaintiffs' arguments "that words
such as 'decency' and 'respect' are inherently subjective." 69 The
court further stated that "decency" and "respect" are "contentless
in the context of American society: the very nature of our
pluralistic society is that there are an infinite number of values and
beliefs and, correlatively, there may be no national 'general stan-
dards of decency."' 70 The court reasoned that because such terms
have no substantive meaning, the statute was not sufficiently de-
fined.71
Moreover, the court applied the Supreme Court's decision in
Grayned v. City of Rockford72 in identifying three offenses that the
between fifty and five hundred dollars or imprisonment for three to six months. Id. The
plaintiff construction company was under contract with the state of Oklahoma and was
engaged in constructing certain bridges within the state. Id. at 389. The Oklahoma
Commission of Labor complained that the rate of wages paid by the company to laborers
was in violation of the statute. Id.
65. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1472.
66. Id. (quoting Connally, 269 U.S. at 390).
67. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 (citing International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 216 (1914) (holding that an antitrust criminal law offers no standard of conduct)).
68. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1471-72.
69. Id. at 1471.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). In Grayned, the Supreme Court expressed that
"[i]t is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined." Id. at 108.
The Finley court applied the Grayned case in recognizing three values which vague
laws offend: "(1) they may trap the innocent by failure to provide fair warning; (2) they
may fail to provide explicit and objective standards and therefore permit arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement; and (3) they may inhibit First Amendment freedoms by
forcing individuals to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone... than if the boundaries of
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decency clause violates. The decency clause: (1) "creates a trap
for the unwary applicant who may engage in expression she or he
believes to comport with the standard, only to learn upon receiving
notice that her or his grant has been withdrawn or a new applica-
tion denied because she or he has offended someone's subjective
understanding of the standard;" '73 (2) does not give guidance to
panelists, the Council, nor the Chairperson in administering the
standard; "each apparently is expected to draw on her or his own
personal views of decency or some ephemeral 'general American
standard of decency;' ' 74 and (3) causes the "imposition of self-
censorship wider than the line drawn by the statute because the
line, is, in effect, imperceptible." 75 The Finley court concluded that
the NEA and NEA grant applicants must guess at the meaning of
the decency clause and will inevitably apply the clause different-
ly.76 The court found the decency provision to be inconsistent with
the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment, concluding
that the decency provision failed to notify adequately the applicants
and NEA staff of the awarding requirements.'
3. Freedom of Expression Protected by the First Amend-
ment
In Finley, the court recognized a protected first amendment
interest in artistic expression funded by the government and held
that "government funding of the arts is subject to the constraints of
the First Amendment.' 78 After analyzing the congressional intent
in creating the NEA, the court found that "artistic expression serves
many of the same values central to a democratic society and under-
lying the First Amendment as does scholarly expression in other
the forbidden areas were clearly marked.'" Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1471 (quoting
Grayned, 408 U.S. 104 at 108-09).
73. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1472.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
76. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1472.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1475. The court noted that "expression which is indecent but not obscene
is protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 1476 (quoting Sable Communications, Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
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fields. '79 The court found that government funding decisions for
the arts require neutrality. 0
The court recognized that artistic expression is central to this
country's cultural and political life.8' The court considered Con-
gress' intent in supporting the arts by creating the NEA: "[The
committee affirms that the intent of this act should be the encour-
agement of free inquiry and expression."82 The court found support
from Congress' statement that "[i]t is vital to a democracy to honor
and preserve its multicultural artistic heritage as well as support
new ideas, and therefore it is essential to provide financial assis-
tance to its artists and the organizations that support their work."83
The court accepted plaintiffs' analogy of government funding
of the arts to government funding of public universities." The
court cited a statement8s that espoused the close relationship be-
tween academic freedom and artistic expression:
Works of the visual and performing arts are important both
in their own right and because they can enhance our experi-
ence and understanding of social institutions and the human
condition. Artistic expression in the classroom, studio and
workshop therefore merits the same assurance of academic
freedom that is accorded to other scholarly and teaching
activities.86
Although recognizing that some content-based decisions are un-
avoidable, the court maintained that the government cannot "im-
pose whatever restrictions it pleases on speech" in funding the arts,
79. Id. at 1474; see 20 U.S.C. § 951 (Supp. IV 1992) (containing the "declaration
of findings and purpose" of the NEA's authorizing statute).
80. See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1475.
81. Id. at 1473.
82. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 300, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1965)).
83. Id. at 1474 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(10) (Supp. III 1991)).
84. Id.
85. Id. The statement was made by participants in a conference sponsored by the
American Association of University Professors, the American Council on Education,
the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, and the Wolf Trap
Foundation. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Academic Freedom and Artistic Expression, ACADEME, July-Aug.
1990, at 13).
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just as it cannot impose such restrictions on speech in a public
university.' Therefore, the court concluded that government subsi-
dization of the arts falls under the protection of the First Amend-
ment.88
Furthermore, the court found that the decency provision sought
to suppress what some may consider offensive speech in this soci-
ety.89 Recognizing that indecent expression is protected by the
First Amendment,90 the court found that the decency provision
"clearly reaches a substantial amount of protected speech."9' The
court held that the decency clause, which favors aiding "decent" art
and denying grants to "indecent" art, "gives rise to the hazard [of]
'a substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression,"' thus
violating the First Amendment.92
m. CRITICISM OF THE FINLEY COURT'S RATIONALE AND DECISION
The Finley decision is flawed for three basic reasons. First, the
court failed to acknowledge that government spending is not sub-
ject to neutrality given congressional discretion therein.93 Second,
the court's finding that the government must be content-neutral in
its funding of the arts is impractical because content must be
judged for artistic merit.94  Finally, the court applied a void for
87. Id. at 1475.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court noted that:
the fact that given speech is thought by many to be highly offensive, either
because it espouses political, religious, racial or other doctrines which to
many are most abhorrent, 0I or because of its use of "indecent" words, ]
does not, absent a conduct arising from such speech, constitute a ground for
abridging speech.
Id. at 1475-76. (quoting MELVILLE B. N2MMER, NIMFR ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §
2.05[B][1], at 2-30 (1991) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969))).
90. Id. at 1476 (citing Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989).
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
93. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (holding that, when a
state implements a value judgment favoring child birth over abortion by its subsidiza-
tion policy, it does not deny a woman her freedom to choose an abortion).
94. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. IV 1992) C'Mhe Chairperson shall ensure that
. . . artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications are
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vagueness standard applicable to criminal cases in its determination
that the decency clause was unconstitutionally vague.95 This crimi-
nal vagueness standard is too strict to apply in the context of gov-
ernment funding. The court failed to recognize that the Supreme
Court has upheld statutes which, by their very nature, cannot be ex-
plicit or specific.'
A. Government Neutrality Not Required in Allocating Funds
1. Denial of funding does not infringe upon a fundamental
right
The court in Finley held that federal funding of the arts is sub-
ject to the protection of the First Amendment. 97 In essence, the
court agreed with the plaintiffs' argument that public subsidization
of art should be treated similarly to public funding of the press and
university activities.98 By comparing artistic expression to that of
expression in universities and other public fora,99 the court deter-
mined that just as decisions based on subjective criteria to suppress
unpopular expression are impermissible when deciding upon hiring
and promoting in universities, the decision to fund particular works
should not suppress certain speech.1° The court, then, reached the
decision that public art funding requires government neutrality in
its granting decisions.1 'O
The court in Finley, however, assumed that the decency clause
judged .... "); Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1475 (stating that "limited public funds are
allocated to support expressive activities, and some content-based decisions are un-
avoidable"); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976) (stating that "neutrality in a program for public funding
of the arts is inconceivable").
95. See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1471-72.
96. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973) (reasoning that "when
triers of fact are asked to decide whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards would consider certain material 'prurient,' it would be unrealistic
to require that the answer be based on some abstract formulation").
97. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1475.
98. See id. at 1472-75.
99. Id. at 1473.
100. id. at 1475.
101. Id. at 1472.
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sought the suppression of certain speech."' 2 Moreover, the court's
decision restricts congressional determination of what type of art
to promote. The criterion of decency in determining NEA grant
recipients is not an attempt by the government to suppress certain
speech, but merely an expression of the government's decision to
allocate funds to promote art whose artistic merit encompasses
decency and respect for the values and beliefs of the American
public.103
The court's analysis contradicts the reasoning in Advocates for
the Arts v. Thomson. In Advocates for the Arts, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit maintained that government
"neutrality in a program for public funding of the arts is inconceiv-
able."'14 The court pointed out that the criteria for funding certain
art projects include the merit of artistic content and that the grantor
cannot escape making judgments on the content of the artistic ex-
pression.'°'
The court found that the government did not intend to
"'abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money
to facilitate and enlarge"' artistic expression."°6 The court distin-
guished the concept of restricting speech and funding art:
A disappointed grant applicant cannot complain that his
work has been suppressed, but only that another's has been
promoted in its stead. The decision to withhold support is
unavoidably based in some part on the "subject matter" or
"content" of expression, for the very assumption of public
funding of the arts is that decisions will be made according
to the literary or artistic worth of competing applicants.
Given this focus on the comparative merit of literary and
artistic works equally entitled to first amendment protection
as "speech[,"I courts have no particular institutional corn-
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1470 (argument made by the government). See Advocates for the Arts
v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795-96 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
104. Advocates for the Arts, 532 F.2d at 796.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 795 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92 (1976)).
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petence warranting case-by-case participation in the alloca-
tion of funds.' °7
The court further reasoned that an applicant does not have any
right to public support of private expression."°8 The court found no
tradition of absolute neutrality in public funding of speech-related
activities." 9 While acknowledging that the standard of artistic
merit is important, the court found that the guidelines of artistic
merit "do not lend themselves to translation into first amendment
standards."" 0 Therefore, the court refused to find a first amend-
ment mandate of content-neutrality for government funding of the
arts.
1 1
2. NEA's Broad Discretionary Powers
The Finley court failed to recognize the broad discretionary
powers of Congress in allocating federal funding of the arts to the
NEA." 2 In Frasier v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York found that, through 20 U.S.C. § 954, Congress gave the
NEA Chairperson broad discretion in determining what constitutes
"art excellence," "artistic merit," and "general standards of decen-
cy.""' 3 In Frasier, the plaintiff claimed that the NEA's method for
denying her funding was unconstitutional. 14 The plaintiff alleged
that the procedure used by the NEA in processing her application
was "arbitrary and without.., legal rationale or basis" and also
107. Id. at 795-96.
108. Id. at 797.
109. Id. at 796. ("As the Supreme Court has observed, '[o]ur statute books are
replete with laws providing financial assistance to the exercise of free speech, such as
aid to public broadcasting and other forms of educational media,. . . preferential post-
al rates and antitrust exemption for newspapers .... .- ) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at
93 n.127 (citations omitted)). But see Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795
F. Supp. 1457, 1475 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that the government cannot "impose
whatever content restrictions it chooses" in funding the arts).
110. Advocates for the Arts, 532 F.2d at 797.
111. See id. at 796-97.
112. See Frasier v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 779 F. Supp.
213 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
113. Id. at 220.
114. Id. at 215.
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was without a uniform method, which resulted in discrimination. 5
The court applied the Administrative Procedure Act" 6 ("APA")
because "Congress waived the government's immunity from judi-
cial review when sought by 'a person suffering legal wrong be-
cause of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agen-
cy action within the meaning of a relevant statute.""'7 Finding that
the APA provided the correct remedial process, the court found,
within the APA, Congress' explicit retention of immunity regarding
agencies' actions committed to agency discretion.'
Therefore, the Frasier court gave deference to the NEA's dis-
cretion in its application decisions." 9 The court stated that since
Congress passed legislation which gives the court "'no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discre-
tion[,]' . . . [the] court cannot-and will not-second-guess the
NEA's conclusions concerning 'art excellence' and 'artistic mer-
it.' ' ' 12° The court concluded that judgments concerning granting of
funds to the arts are clearly left to the NEA's discretion and that
such judgments are not reviewable.' 2' Since Congress failed to
specify a rigid standard for determining the criteria for grants, the
Finley court should have acknowledged NEA's discretion to use its
professional judgment in determining artistic merit while taking
into consideration the general standards of decency and respect for
the American public.
B. Spending Power of Congress Allows Congress to Support
One Activity Over Another
The Constitution empowers Congress to "lay and collect
115. Id. at 219.
116. 5 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
117. Frasier, 779 F. Supp. at 219 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988)).
118. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988) ('This chapter applies . . . except to the
extent that ... agency action is committed to agency discretion by law .... "). Be-
cause "agency decision-making often involves 'a complicated balancing of a number
of factors which are peculiarly within [the agency's] expertise,' Congress retained
immunity for decisions based upon agency discretion." Frasier, 779 F. Supp. at 219-
20 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)).
119. See Frasier, 779 F. Supp. at 219-20.
120. Id. at 220 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830).
121. Id.
1993]
646 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
[tiaxes, [d]uties, [i]mposts, and [e]xcises, to pay the [d]ebts and
provide for the common [d]efen[s]e and general [w]elfare of the
United States."' 22 In accordance with this power, Congress may
attach certain conditions on receipt of federal funds including com-
pliance with federal statutory and administrative directives.12 3 The
spending power does have several general restrictions: (1) the
funds must be in pursuit of the general welfare, and the courts
should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress in this re-
gard;'24 (2) the recipients should be aware of the federal conditions
enabling them to choose to participate knowingly; 12 and (3) the
conditions should relate to the governmental interest in particular
national programs or projects. 26
These restrictions have been met by the NEA. First, the NEA
serves the general public by appropriating funds to release creative
talent while helping to create, sustain, and encourage freedom of
thought and imagination. 27 Second, Congress established qualifi-
cations in a set of guidelines which explains the considerations in
making funding determinations.12  Third, the conditions on the
grants relate to the national program of promoting the arts and the
humanities.' 29
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
123. Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (Burger, C.J., plurality).
124. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640, 645 (1937).
125. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
126. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978).
127. See 20 U.S.C. § 951 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). "To fulfill its educational
mission, achieve an orderly continuation of free society, and provide models of excel-
lence to the American people, the Federal Government must transmit the achievement
and values of civilization from the past via the present to the future, and make widely
available the greatest achievements of art." 20 U.S.C. § 951(11) (Supp. IV 1992).
128. See 20 U.S.C. § 954 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
129. Congress declared that:
(5) It is necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to comple-
ment, assist, and add to programs for the advancement of the humanities and
the arts by local, State, regional, and private agencies and their organizations.
In doing so, the Government must be sensitive to the nature of public spon-
sorship. Public funding of the arts and humanities is subject to the condi-
tions that traditionally govern the use of public money. Such funding should
contribute to public support and confidence in the use of taxpayer funds.
Public funds provided by the Federal Government must ultimately serve pub-
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Although the spending power may not be used to induce recipi-
ents to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitu-
tional, 13 government spending is not subject to neutrality in decid-
ing which projects to fund. For example, in Maher v. Roe,13 1 the
Supreme Court upheld a state welfare regulation which gave pay-
ments to Medicaid recipients for childbirth-related services but not
for non-therapeutic abortions. Therefore, the government may
"make a value judgment" in favoring one type of service over an-
other and implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds. 32  By encouraging specific activities with subsidies, the
government does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. It has
"merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the oth-
er.', 133 The Supreme Court has held that a legislature's decision not
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe
the right itself.'34
A basic difference exists between direct government interfer-
ence with a protected right and government encouragement of an-
other activity in accordance with legislative policy. 5 Congress'
intent to have decision-makers consider general standards of decen-
cy in determining artistic merit is not designed "to discriminate
invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'aim at the suppres-
sion of dangerous ideas.""' 136 Therefore, since the government does
not have an affirmative duty to allocate resources in promoting
lic purposes the Congress defines.
(6) The arts and the humanities reflect the high place accorded by the Amer-
ican people to the nation's rich cultural heritage and to the fostering of mu-
tual respect of the divers beliefs and values of all persons and groups.
20 U.S.C. § 951(5)-(6) (Supp. IV 1992).
130. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987).
131. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
132. Id. at 474.
133. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991).
134. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)
(unanimously upholding a portion of the Internal Revenue Statute that denied tax ex-
empt status to organization contribution for lobbying activity). The statutory scheme
"did not penalize persons for engaging in nonpunishable speech, the lobbying of gov-
ernmental organizations for charitable goals, but only constituted a refusal by Congress
to subsidize lobbying activities." 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTIrurTONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 46 (2d ed. 1992).
135. Maher, 432 U.S. at 475.
136. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 548 (citation omitted).
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artistic expression, the decision not to promote "indecent" art
places no governmental obstacle in the path of an artist who choos-
es not to conform with the general standards of decency; but rather,
by means of preferential subsidization of "decent" art, the govern-
ment supports an alternative activity deemed in the public inter-
est.1
37
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation, the Supreme Court
has held that Congress' refusal to subsidize lobbying does not vio-
late the First Amendment. 3 8 Under the Internal Revenue Code,
organizations are denied grants where a "substantial part of the
activities of which [an organization] is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation." 139 In Taxation With
Representation, the Internal Revenue Service denied the defendant
tax exempt status because it seemed that a majority of the defen-
dant's activities would be lobbying in Congress."4
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that the First Amend-
ment does not require Congress to subsidize lobbying.' 4' The
Court announced that strict scrutiny does not apply whenever Con-
gress subsidizes some speech while refusing to subsidize other
speech.'42 Recognizing that the defendant may not be able to "ex-
ercise its freedom of speech as much as it would like" without the
tax exempt status, the Supreme Court held that "the Constitution
'does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary
to realize all the advantages of that freedom."", 143 Therefore, the
defendant is free to lobby in Congress but will not be subsidized
by the government for its activities.' 44 Similarly, NEA applicants
137. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980) (holding that restricting the
availability of certain abortions under Medicaid does not violate a liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause); see also Regan, 461 U.S. at 546 (a legislature is not required
to subsidize first amendment rights through a tax exemption or tax deduction).
138. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545-46.
139. Id. at 542 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)(1988)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 546 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959)). A tax
exemption is equivalent to a cash grant of the tax amount an organization would have
to pay on its income. Id. at 544.
142. Id. at 548.
143. Id. at 550 (quoting Harris v. McRae 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)).
144. See id. at 546 (stating that "Congress has simply chosen not to pay for [the
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are free to express themselves without any funding from the gov-
ernment.
Critics argue that because the NEA plays a dominant role in the
art community's financial affairs, the NEA's denial of funding
affects "the competitive market for funding of artistic endeav-
ors. '1 45 NEA grants may help artists, not only financially, but also
by giving it a mark of approval of its artistic qualities. 46 The ar-
gument follows that in denying NEA funds, the government is also
denying some artists an opportunity to express themselves in their
art147 Furthermore, some artists may be "chilled" in the scope of
their work in trying to conform to "the general standards of decen-
cy" provision.
148
It must be noted, however, that the NEA, when refusing to fund
thousands of applicants, is not blacklisting the denied applicants as
artists with indecent work or without artistic excellence. 149 The art
defendant's] activity").
145. Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, (C.D. Cal.
1991) (citation omitted); see also Alagna, supra note 29, at 1557. Opponents of the
NEA decency clause have argued that the government's standards censor artists'
speech. See, e.g., Donald W. Hawthorne, Subversive Subsidization: How NEA Art
Funding Abridges Private Speech, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 437 (1992). A "struggling
artist" could be "extremely" tempted to alter his or her creative talent to fit in the
NEA's guidelines for grant decisions. Id. at 440. It is also recognized that many
courts would find that this temptation from NEA grants "which the artist has no claim
of entitlement as too minimal to be deemed coercive." Id. at 441. An artist, who has
been denied funding by the NEA, may be jeopardized "because the NEA is recognized
and respected for identifying artists who produce works of exceptional quality." Id.
146. See Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 783.
147. See id.
148. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1470
(C.D. Cal. 1992); see also Sher, supra note 20, at 1136-37. In a footnote, the Finley
court stated that an argument could have been made that the decency provision "con-
stitutes a facially unconstitutional condition" which restricts a great proportion of non-
funded expression. Since the plaintiffs failed to raise that argument, the court did not
address it. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1472 n.18.
149. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. IV 1992) ("The disapproval or approval of an
application by the Chairperson shall not be construed to mean, and shall not be consid-
ered as evidence that, the project, production, workshop, or program for which the
applicant requested financial assistance is or is not obscene."). In Finley, the NEA
argued that the phrase, "taking into consideration general standards of decency and
respect for the values of the American public," is implicit in assessing artistic merit.
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community should realize that the NEA is promoting one work
instead of another5 ° with its limited budget, instead of thinking that
all art that is denied funding does not have artistic merit. There-
fore, artists are free to express themselves, but not all can be ex-
pected to be given government funding. Unless there is proof that
Congress is "discriminat[ing] invidiously in its subsidies in such a
way as to "'aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas, ' 5' the
inclusion of "the general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs of the American public"'152 in determining artistic
merit should be held constitutional.
C. The Finley Court Should Have Tolerated Some Vagueness
in a Public Funding Statute
1. The Decency Clause Does Not Deprive Persons of Their
Property or Liberty Under the Fifth Amendment
By striking down the decency clause as void for vagueness
under the Due Process Clause, the Finley court imposed too strict
a test for government funding for the arts by equating the decency
clause with statutes for criminal infractions. 153 The court mistak-
enly supported its decision with cases involving criminal penal-
ties.5 4 It failed to recognize that the Supreme Court has held that
Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1470. The NEA's argument that the decency provision is
implicit in determining artistic merit may be supported by Congress' failure to insert a
corresponding provision that applicants whose works have been denied shall not mean
that the works are indecent.
150. See Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795-96 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
151. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (quoting
Camnarano v. United States 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
152. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
153. See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1471-72.
154. See id. The void for vagueness doctrine applies to all criminal laws and
laws that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional rights. Criminal laws
must give notice to the people as to what activity is made criminal so as to provide
fair notice to persons before making the activity and also to restrict the authority of
police officers to arrest persons for violating the law. Several rationales require spe-
cial judicial strictness when reviewing laws that regulate constitutional rights. "First,
the requirement that a law place persons on notice as to precisely what activity is
made criminal is of special importance when the activity distinguishes between crimi-
nal activity and activity which constitutes a fundamental constitutional right ...." An
unclear law regulating speech might deter or chill persons from engaging in speech or
activity with special protection under the Constitution. A second reason for enforcing
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the Constitution tolerates some degree of vagueness in statutes
depending upon the nature of the statute's enactment and the rela-
tive importance of fair enforcement and fair notice."' Since the
consequences of imprecision are less severe in civil enactments as
compared to criminal statutes, greater tolerance has been given to
the former. 56 Yet, "perhaps the most important factor affecting the
clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it threat-
ens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights."'157
The Finley court held that "the decency clause seeks to suppress
speech that is offensive to some in society."158 There is no show-
ing, however, that the decency clause seeks to suppress certain
speech. 5 9 The government merely uses "public money to facilitate
and enlarge artistic expression" and does not seek to censor,
abridge, or restrict speech 6°
In reaching its decision, the Finley court applied the three
"evils" of a vague law as found in Grayned v. City of Rockford.161
In Grayned, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
an anti-picketing and an antinoise ordinance which imposed crimi-
the void for vagueness doctrine "is to require that there be clear guidelines to govern
law enforcement. . . . Thirdly, because the First Amendment needs breathing space,
the governmental regulation that is tolerated must be drawn with 'narrow specificity.'.
. . Moreover there is a special danger of tolerating in the first amendment area 'the
existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application' ...."
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 134, at 36-7. The decency clause is not within a crimi-
nal statute nor a statute that regulates a fundamental constitutional right. The decency
clause is within a public funding statute for the arts.
155. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 498 (1982) (holding that an ordinance that requires a business to obtain a license
if it sells any items that are "designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or
drugs" is not facially overbroad or vague).
156. See id. at 498-99 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948)
(stating that "[tihe standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher
than in those depending upon civil sanctions for enforcement").
157. See id. at 499.
158. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1475.
159. See 136 CONG. REC. H12,416 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Coleman) ("[W]e do not want to stifle creativity .... I hope.., that the chairman of
the NEA uses good common sense in recognizing this creativity .... ).
160. See Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92 (1976)).
161. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1472 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108-09 (1972)).
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nal prosecution and penalties.1 62 The first concern under Grayned
is that fair warning must be given.163 The basic assumption in
Grayned was that "man is free to steer between lawful and unlaw-
ful conduct.' ' 64 The second concern deals with arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement. The Court feared that police officers,
judges, and juries would be resolving matters on a subjective and
ad hoc basis.1 65 Applying Edwards v. South Carolina,16 the Su-
preme Court expressed concern that in arresting, convicting, and
punishing, the vague law would infringe rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment. 67 The third concern is that a vague statute may
inhibit first amendment liberties. The Court relied upon its deci-
sion in Baggett v. Bullit,168 which stated that the state may not
allow a possibility of prosecution, with the imposition of penalties
for perjury, by requiring a state employee to take an unduly broad
162. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107-08. In this case, Grayned was convicted for his
part in a demonstration in front of a high school. At the time of his arrest, Rockford's
anti-picketing ordinance provided the following: "A person commits disorderly con-
duct when he knowingly ...[plickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150
feet of any primary or secondary school building .... ." The antinoise ordinance stat-
ed that "no person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in
which a school or any class thereof... shall willfully make or assist in the making of
any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of
such school session." id.
163. Id. at 108.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 108-09.
166. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). One hundred eighty-seven petitioners peacefully as-
sembled at the site of the State Government of South Carolina to express their griev-
ances and were convicted of the common-law crime of breach of the peace. Id. at
229-30.
167. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 n.5.
168. 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (holding that the provision and oath in question were
unduly vague and violated due process). Members of the faculty, staff, and students
of the University of Washington brought a class action for a judgment declaring un-
constitutional state statutes requiring the taking of oaths, one for teachers and the other
for all state employees, as a condition of employment. Id. at 361-62. The statute
required teachers to swear to promote respect for the flag and the institution of the
United States and the State of Washington, reverence for law and order and undivided
allegiance to the United States Government. Id. A state employee was required to
swear that he or she was not a subversive person: that he or she did not advise, teach,
or incite others to overthrow the constitutional form of government by revolution,
force, or violence. Id. at 362.
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oath.169
The standards for evaluating vagueness in Grayned should not
be mechanically applied17 ° the way the court did in Finley. The
criminal cases which the Finley court applied manifest the Supreme
Court's concern against vague statutes which incurred criminal
prosecution and fines.' These criminal cases are not analogous to
the Finley case since the NEA legislation is not a criminal statute
which describes crimes and specifies punishment, but rather it is an
administrative guideline for government funding of the arts. The
premise that persons are "free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct' 7 2 in Grayned does not apply in the Finley case because
the NEA does not punish applicants who are not awarded funding.
In Finley, the statutory language at issue is in the context of
government funding of the arts, which is not a constitutional
right.17 3 Although judges must use their subjective understanding
of "artistic excellence and artistic merit" to decide which art pro-
jects should receive NEA grants, 74 at worst, applicants are denied
funding; they are not criminally punished. The applicants for gov-
ernment funding will not be deprived of property or liberty under
the Fifth Amendment because there is no "right" to public support
of private expression.175  Artists are free to express themselves in
their works but need not be financially subsidized by the govern-
169. Id. at 374.
170. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
498 (1982).
171. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 390, 393 (1926) (reason-
ing that if a vague criminal statute is enforced, it will deprive persons of their liberty
and property without due process of law; the Court was concerned that persons may
risk "incurring severe and cumulative penalties" from a vague criminal statute);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 106 (1972) (concerning an anti-picketing
and an antinoise ordinance with criminal convictions and fines); Baggett, 377 U.S. at
366 (involving oath requirements and statutory provision incurring the possibility of
prosecution imposing the penalties of perjury); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963) (concerning the common law crime of breach of the peace which the state
trial court imposed fines from ten to one hundred dollars and five to thirty days in
jail).
172. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
173. See Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 797 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
174. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
175. Advocates for the Arts, 532 F.2d at 797.
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ment.
In Frasier v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
the United States District Court of the Northern District of New
York held that the plaintiff did not possess a right to government
funding entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause.76 In
1989, the plaintiff, Frasier, applied for a grant to purchase a
$15,000 "computer-assisted design work-station" for a "Design
Advancement Project" grant through the NEA's Design Arts Pro-
gram and submitted a separate unrelated proposal to the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services ("HHS").'" After the
agencies denied her applications, Frasier brought suit claiming that
the NEA's and HHS's procedures for funding were unconstitutional
and illegal, violating at least thirty-nine federal statutes and regula-
tions, two constitutional provisions, and numerous common laws.17
The Frasier court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim
for relief.179  The court found that Frasier's "desire for funding,
without more, does not rise to the level of a constitutionally pro-
tected interest."'"8 In determining whether Frasier has a "legitimate
claim of interest," the court had to determine if any law or rule
affirmatively entitled Frasier to government funding.' Recogniz-
ing that both the NEA and HHS have broad discretion under their
respective enabling acts, the court held that Frasier was not consti-
tutionally entitled to government funding.8 2
176. 779 F. Supp. 213, 222 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
177. Id. at 214-15.
178. Id. at 215. Plaintiff erroneously invoked the due process protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment instead of under the Fifth Amendment since the NEA and
the HHS are federal agencies. Id. at 221.
179. Id. at 214.
180. Id. at 222.
181. Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (stating that
"[to have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an ab-
stract need or desire for it[;] [h]e must have more than a unilateral expectation of it[;]
[h]e must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it")).
182. Id.
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2. General language in the decency clause should be
deemed constitutional when compared to language of
constitutional obscenity statutes
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
imprecision itself does not offend the Constitution as long as the
language sufficiently conveys a definite warning as to the pro-
scribed conduct "when measured by common understanding and
practices. ' '  Therefore, since all statutes cannot be explicit be-
cause of the nature of the subject matter, "common understanding"
should be taken into consideration. For example, the general lan-
guage used in obscenity statutes is similar to the general language
of the decency clause, yet the obscenity language is deemed consti-
tutional.1l 4 Applying this rationale in obscenity cases, the decency
clause should not be void for vagueness.
In Miller v. California, the United States Supreme Court faced
the issue of defining the state standards for identifying obscene
material that may be enforced without violating the First Amend-
ment.185 In Miller, the defendant was convicted by a jury of vio-
lating a misdemeanor of "knowingly distributing obscene matter"
when he advertised the sale of illustrated books containing "adult
material." ' 6  At the time of his alleged offense, the California
Penal Code defined "obscene matter" as that which:
to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the
predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to
prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudi-
ty, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond cus-
tomary limits of candor in description or representation of
such matters and is matter which is utterly without redeem-
ing social importance. 8 7
183. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 28 (1973) (quoting United States v.
Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947)).
184. See id. at 15; Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
185. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20, 36 (reaffirming that obscene material is not protected
by the First Amendment).
186. Id. at 16.
187. Id. at 37 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 311(a) at the time of the commission of
the alleged offense). The California Penal Code has since been modified to define ob-
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The Court limited a state's statutory definition of obscenity to
works that "taken as whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex
... and which... do not have serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value." ' The Court further stated that the fact finder
must determine "whether 'the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards' would find that the work.., appeals to
the prurient interests."'18 9
The Supreme Court held the requirement that the jury evaluate
allegedly obscene materials with reference to contemporary stan-
dards of California to be constitutionally adequate.19 Recognizing
that the United States is too large and too diverse to expect nation-
al standards to be articulated, the Court stated that a requirement
for an abstract formulation for a jury would be unrealistic.' 91 The
Court was satisfied that the specific guidelines would provide "fair
notice to a dealer in [obscene] materials that his public and com-
mercial activities may bring prosecution."' 92 Therefore, the Cali-
scene matter as:
matter taken as a whole, which to the average person, applying contemporary
statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest, and is matter which, tak-
en as a whole, depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual con-
duct; and which, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 311(a) (West Supp. 1993).
188. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
189. Id. (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (holding that obscenity is outside the protec-
tion intended for speech and for the press))). The guidelines for the fact finder must
be:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value.
Id.
190. Id. at 33.
191. Id. at 30.
192. Id. at 27 (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 491-92). The Court recognized that al-
though
[mlany decisions have recognized that the terms of obscenity statutes are not
precise, . . . [when they are] applied according to the proper standard for
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fornia obscenity statute passed constitutional muster.
Furthermore, in Smith v. United States,193 the Supreme Court
determined that community standards should not be defined by the
legislature.'94 The Supreme Court had to decide "whether [a] jury
is entitled to rely on its own knowledge of community standards,
or whether a state legislature (or a smaller legislative body) may
declare what the community standards shall be."' 95 In its reason-
ing, the Court analogized the function of "contemporary community
standards" in obscenity cases and "reasonable" in other cases.19
The Court found that it would be inappropriate for a legislature to
try to define the contemporary community standard just as it would
be inappropriate for a legislature to try to define the word "reason-
ableness" for a jury. 97
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that the possibility that
persons might reach different conclusions regarding the same mate-
rial does not make a statute which prohibits the mailing of obscene
materials unconstitutional for vagueness.1 98 Therefore, judging a
particular material "in light of the jurors' understanding of contem-
porary community standard," rather than judging with explicit,
descriptive criteria, is constitutionally valid in obscenity cases.99
Although the Supreme Court reaffirmed a community standard for
judging obscenity, give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and
mark... boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to ad-
minister the law .... That there may be marginal cases in which it is diffi-
cult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls
is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a crimi-
nal offense.
Id. at 27-28 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
193. 431 U.S. 291 (1977). In Smith, the petitioner was indicted for violating a
federal statute which prohibits the mailing of obscene materials. Id. at 296.
194. Id. at 302-03.
195. Id. at 302.
196. Id. (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974)).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 309 (stating that prohibited conduct covered by the obscenity statute
"can be ascertained with sufficient east to avoid due process pitfalr') (citing Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 n.30 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 n.9
(1973)).
199. See id.
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a juror rather than a national standard, an abstract, unascertainable
national standard, as found in the decency clause, should be consti-
tutionally valid.Y°
Following the Finley court's reasoning that no "general stan-
dards of decency" exist,20' the average person would be incapable
of applying the constitutionally accepted "contemporary community
standards. '"2°' The Finley court's reasoning, therefore, fails because
the general language of "contemporary community standards" for
determining obscene matters, deemed constitutional in Miller and
Smith, would also fall the Grayned test under the Finley analysis.20 3
200. Cf. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). In Pope, the petitioners were
charged with selling obscene magazines. Id. at 499. The petitioners argued that the
third prong of the Miller test, "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious,
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," should be judged on an objective basis
and not by reference to contemporary community standards. Id. (quoting Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the application of
contemporary community standards to the first and second prongs of the Miller test
(the prurient interest and patently offensive prongs). Id. at 500. But regarding the
value question in the third prong of the Miller test, the Court held that the proper
inquiry is "whether a reasonable person would find such value in the material." Id. at
500-01.
201. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1471 (C.D.
Cal. 1992) (agreeing with the plaintiffs' argument that the words "'decency' and 're-
spect' are inherently subjective... [and] are contentless in the context of American
society").
202. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
203. For a discussion of the Miller standard and the NEA obscenity clause, see
Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohnnayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
Under the NEA policies at issue in Bella Lewitzky, before distributing funds to ap-
proved applicants, the NEA required that approved applicants certify that they would
comply with the "General Terms and Conditions for Organizational Grant Recipients"
(the "certification requirement"). The certification requirement copied language from
§ 304 of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
1990:
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the [NEA] ... be used
to promote, disseminate, or produce material which in the judgment of the
NEA ... be considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of
sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children or indi-
viduals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Id. at 776 (quoting Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989)). The
plaintiff brought suit alleging that the NEA's certification requirement violated the
Fifth and First Amendments. Id. at 781-82.
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It would be impractical, if not impossible, to describe artistic merit
in any meaningful way so that it could pass the strict Grayned test.
Therefore, the Finley court should not have applied the Grayned
test to invalidate the decency clause.
The court in Finley feared that an NEA panelist had "no guid-
ance in administering the [decency] standard; each apparently [was]
expected to draw on her or his own personal views of decency or
some ephemeral 'general American standard of decency."' ° Yet
in an obscenity trial, the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant
is determined primarily by "individual jurors' subjective reactions
to the materials in question rather than by the predictable applica-
tion of rules of law."205 Furthermore, obscenity trials may result in
The United States District Court of the Central District of California held that the
NEA's certification requirement was unconstitutionally vague because the NEA deter-
mined what constituted obscenity. Id. at 782. The court found that even though the
NEA vowed it would be using the Miller standard to determine obscenity, the Miller
standard would not remedy the vagueness of the provision for two reasons. First, the
NEA policy statements to apply the Miller standard do not legally bind the agency.
Id. (citing Vietnam Veterans v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (stating that an agency is free to act differently from its policy statements or its
interpretive rules)). Second, the NEA cannot provide the safety procedures stated in
Miller. Id. (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25) (the safeguards include: (1) a statute
must specifically define the forbidden conduct; (2) a full adversarial trial be held; and
(3) a jury must apply community standards of obscenity)). The court in Bella
Lewitzky reasoned that "the NEA is a national-level agency that, by hypothesis, is in-
capable of applying varying community standards for obscenity" to fulfill the third
procedural safeguard in Miller. Id. at 781 (citing Miller, 413, U.S. at 24-25).
Presently, Congress does not fund works "that are determined to be obscene." 20
U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. IV 1992). Congress defined the phrase "determined to be ob-
scene" as to mean "in a final judgment of a court of record and of competent jurisdic-
tion in the United States." 20 U.S.C. § 952(j) (Supp. IV 1992). An obscene work is
one that:
(1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that such project, production, workshop, or program, when taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(2) ... depict or describe sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and
(3) ... when taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value.
20 U.S.C. § 952(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
In Bella Lewitzky, the plaintiff did not challenge the decency clause.
204. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1472.
205. Smith, 431 U.S. at 316.
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criminal convictions and penalties, but the NEA application pro-
cess, at worst, merely results in the denial of funding. Undoubted-
ly, subjective views must be relied upon in determining artistic
merit.20 Following the Supreme Court's rationales in Miller and
Smith concerning criminal penalties, the Finley court, in consider-
ing government funding, should have acknowledged that explicit
and specific criteria for artistic excellence that includes the general
standards of decency are ineffable and, therefore, not required.
3. An artistic standard, as a practical matter, cannot be
explicit
The court in Finley reasoned that because the words "decency"
and "respect" are "inherently subjective" and "contentless" in this
society, the provision must be vague. °7 The court, however, failed
to recognize that "[tihe purpose of such a program [as the NEA] is
to promote 'art,' the very definition of which requires an exercise
of judgment from case to case. 20 8 In Advocates for the Arts v.
Thomson, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that the government's refusal to award an art grant to a liter-
ary magazine, on the basis that it had "published a poem.., which
contain[ed] language and imagery that some may find offensive,"
did not violate the plaintiff's first amendment or fourteenth amend-
ment due process rights.2' 9
In Advocates for the Arts, the plaintiffs contended that decisions
for art grants should follow "'narrow standards and guidelines' that
will insulate the result from the prejudices of the decision-
206. Pope v. Illinois is not inapposite because the Supreme Court announced an
objective, national "reasonable person" standard to determine de minimus value of the
material in question in the context of criminal statutes. 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
A subjective national standard, however, can be applied to determine artistic merit
because the art work is being determined for artistic excellence in the context of pub-
lic funding, not for de minimus value.
207. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1471.
208. Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796 (Ist Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976). The New Hampshire Commission on the Arts adminis-
tered NEA funding in that state. Grants over $500 had to be approved by the gover-
nor and Council of New Hampshire.
209. Id. at 798.
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maker."210 The court questioned how the committee could refine
or elaborate realistically the standards and guidelines of artistic and
cultural merit.211 The court reasoned that without ascertainable
principles defining artistic merit, official discretion could not be
constitutionally required to be defined in "objective and definite
standards. 212  Therefore, the court in Finley should not have
voided the decency clause for vagueness because artistic standards
cannot possibly be explicitly defined.
CONCLUSION
Awarding government subsidies to NEA grant applicants in-
volves allocating finite resources among a myriad of artistic pro-
jects. The whole system of judging applications requires the con-
sideration of content when judging "artistic merit. '213 Some art
projects are promoted inevitably at the expense of other art pro-
jects. In enacting the decency clause, Congress was not attempting
to "control... the search for political truth"'214 or to suppress dan-
gerous ideas. The First Amendment does not require that the gov-
ernment be neutral in its policy decision to fund "decent" art and
not to fund "indecent" art. Even if the higher courts agree that art
is "at the core of a democratic society's cultural and political vitali-
ty,,,215 the courts must also agree with the Finley decision that fund-
ing of the arts must be treated equally to funding of universities.1 6
According to the spending power of Congress, the government
need not be neutral in determining the allocation of subsidies.
210. Id. at 796 (citation omitted).
211. Id. at 797.
212. Id. (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151
(1969)).
213. Sabrin, supra note 14, at 1233; Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts,
795 F. Supp. 1457, 1475 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that "some content-based decisions
are unavoidable" in allocating funds for expressive activities).
214. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984) (quoting Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980)).
215. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1473.
216. See id. at 1475. Acting within its congressional spending power, the govern-
ment is supporting one activity over another and is not seeking to suppress certain
expression.
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The Finley court erred in demanding that the decency clause
had to be more explicit. Obscenity statutes, incurring criminal
liabilities, have been found constitutional regardless of the gener-
ality of the language used to proscribe certain expression. Jurors
in obscenity trials must use their subjective understanding of com-
munity decency; similarly, the NEA must use its professional judg-
ment in determining artistic merit, "taking into consideration the
general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and
values of the American public."2 17 Under the decency clause, the
NEA is not affirmatively denying applicants the liberty to express
themselves artistically. Rather, Congress is exercising its constitu-
tional discretion in deciding how to allocate funds in support of the
arts.
J. Sarah Kim
217. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
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